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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
-------------
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
GUY V. RONNEBURG, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) 
) ) . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
BRIEF 
Case No. 18116· 
The Appellant, Salt Lake City, seeks to have this Court 
uphold the constitutionality of both the City's ordinan~e, 
Section 19-3-9, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, which 
prohibits persons under twenty-one years of age from remaining in 
or about a tavern, and its right, under the police power, to 
enact s~ch an ordinance. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
The Defendant, Guy V. Ronneburg, was charged and convicted 
in the Fifth Circuit Court for allowing minors in a tavern in 
violation of Section 19-3-9 of the Revised Ordinances o~ Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended. Respondent-Ronneburg 
thereafter appealed his conviction to the Third Judicial District 
Court. 
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The district court, through the Honorable Judge Bryant H. 
Groft, ruled that the enactment of the subject ordinance was 
beyond the power of the City and was therefore unconstitutional, 
on the grounds of being arbitrary and unreasonable. 
The City then instituted this appeal to this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of this case demonstrate the following: 
· 1. The Defendant-Ronneburg was employed as the food and 
beverage manager by the Ramada Inn located in Salt Lake City. 
( T-6, 2 6) 
2. On the evening of November 6, 1980, the defendant, as 
the acting manager of the motel and was -in charge of the motel 
premises, including a tavern known as "The Study~-·, which is 
located on the premise of the motel. (T-6, 26) 
3. During the time the defendant was in charge of the 
premises, a fashion show was conducted on the premises of The 
------ ---·--·----------·--· 
Study, which is the possessor of a Class "C" beer license. issued 
by the City. (T 4-5) 
4. The Salt Lake City Police Department had been notified 
that persons under the age of twenty-one .had been participating 
in the fashion shows held in the tav~rn. 1 Police were present on 
1H6lders of Class "C" Beer licenses are commonly referred to as 
bars, taverns, or lounges. Such establishments may sell draft 
beer on their premises and are required to keep from their 
premises persons under the age of twenty-one. See Sections 
19-2-6 and 19-3-9, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1 9 6 5 , as amended , a t ta_c_h_e_d----a-s--A,__p_p_e_n-=d:""'"li,_.x_e_s_-n"~A-=-"=---a-n-d~~ ..~B~'T""'1 .--....---
-2-
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the evening of November 6th, and ascertained that two ir:rlividuals 
participating in the fashion show held in the tavern were under 
the age of twenty-one. Both persons received citations for said 
offense. (T 4-5) 
5. After the police officers had ascertained from the 
defendant that he was in charge of, and had responsibility for, 
the premises, the defendant was issued a citation for permitting 
persons under twenty-one years of age to remain in a tavern. (T-
5-7) 
6. The defendant-was tried on the 9th day of December, 1980 
in the Fifth Circuit Court and was found guilty of permitting 
persons under the age of twenty-one to remain in a tavern, in 
violation of Section 19-3-9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah·. (T-1, 26) 
7. The defendant thereafter appealed his conviction to the 
Third Judicial District Court. On appeal, the Honorable- Judge 
Bryant Croft, sua s:ponte, raised the issues of the City's power 
to enact a strict liability ordinance and its power to prohibit 
persons under the age of twenty-one from the premises of 
taverns. Finding the City had neither power, the District Court 
held that Section 19-3-9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, Utah, was unconstitutional on grounds of being arbitrary 
and unreasonable. (The memorandum decision of Judge Croft is 
-3-
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attached hereto. as Appendix "C".)' 
8. The Appellant City thereafter filed the current appeal 
with the Utah Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 19-3-9, REVISED 
ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CONSTI-
TUTES A VALID EXERCISE OF THE CITY'S POLICE 
POWER AND THE ORDINANCE IS CONSTITUTIONAL IN 
ALL RESPECTS. 
A. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN BOTH 
SPECIFIC AND GENERAL POWERS TO REGULATE THE 
CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH BEER MAY BE SOLD 
WITHIN THEIR JURISDICTIONS. 
Section 19-3-9, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
1965, as amended, is one of a number of ordinances enacted by the 
City in order to regulate the sale and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages within the City's limits. This section provides: 
"It shal 1 be unlawful and sh al 1 cons ti tu te an offense 
of s tr i ct 1-iab i.l i. ty. _£or_ __ .an_y __ iice n s e e_ __ of a Class_'~_,__or__ __ ----
Class "D", license for the sale of beer or any 
operator, agent, or employee of such licensee to permit 
any person under the age of twenty-one years to remain 
in or about such licensed premise." 
I 
On appeal, the district cou!t held this ordinance unconsti-
tutional in part, on the basis that the City did not have the 
power to enact an ordinance prohibiting persons under the age of 
twenty-one from being present on the premises of a tavern. 
The court so held notwithstanding the provisions of Section 
10-8-47, Utah Code Annotated,. 1953, as amended, which provides in 
-4-
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--- ··--
part: 
"They [cities] may prevent intoxication ..• and may 
prohibit the sale, giving away or furnishing of 
intoxi.cating liquors or narcotics, or of tobacco to any 
person under twenty-one years of age. . . • " 
The district court strictly construed this statute and ruled 
that it did not include the right of the City to also prohibit 
individuals under the age of twenty-one from being on certain 
premises where such beverages are sold.· 
The Court also reviewed Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, the City's general welfare clause, which 
gives municipalities authority to enact al 1 ordinances necessary 
and proper to provide for the peace and. general welfare of the 
City. 2 However, the district court was not persuaded that the 
two statutes together gave the cities an expanded right to enact the 
present ordinance. It therefore declared the ordinance invalid. 
The City respectfully submits that based upon the above two 
s ta tu tes, ·10-s-·47 and ~0-8-84, i.t does have power to enact the 
ordinances. in question. An additional basis for such power is 
found in Section 32-4-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
J 
which provides in relevant part: 
"Cities and towns within their corporate limits, .• • 
shall have power to license, tax, regulate or prohibit 
the sale of light beer, at retail, in bottles or 
draft; •••• " (emphasis added) 
2 h · · · 1 o 8 8 4 t f th i· n Append i' x "D" • T e prov1s1ons of Section - - are se or 
-5-
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Interpreting the powers given to a city under the above-
cited statute, this Court has held that "since a city can 
regulate or prohibit the sale [of beer] entirely, certainly it 
can impose any reasonable regulations thereon. 11 Triangle Oil 
Inc., v. North Salt Lake, 609 P.2d 1338, 1339 (1980),· emphasis 
added. In finding that North Salt Lake's restriction regarding 
the number of outlets the.City had authorized for the sale of 
beer, this Court held: 
"In relation to the problem dealt herein, it is 
generally recognized that because beer is a beverage 
containing alcohol, its sale is sufficiently related to 
the public health, morals and safety, that it is 
subject to regulation under the police power ..•• " 
(emphasis added) Id. at 1339. 
The court concluded its opinion with the following language: 
" ••• Because of the seriousness of judicial responsi-. 
bility in having the final word in its inter-relation-
ship with other departments and institutions of govern-
ment, it has been found to be wise and proper judicial 
policy to exercise its powers with restraint, and not 
to intrude into or interfere with the discretionary 
functions or the policies of other departments of ________ _ 
government. Accordingly, the courts generally will not 
so interfere with the actions of a city council unless 
its action is outside of its authority or is so whollt 
discordant to reason and justice th~t its action must 
be deemed ca;er icious and arbitrary and thus in 
violation of complainant's rights." (emphasis added) 
Id. at 1339, 1340. 
Since the City has the power to absolutely prohibit the sale 
of beer within its corporate limits, the City may also enact 
reasonable regulations pertaining to the sale of such 
beverages. It is beyond dispute that local governments, under 
-6-
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the police power, can restrict the sale of beer within close 
proximity of schools, and churches, 3 they may also under such 
power and the Twenty-first Amendment, prohibit certain conduct, 
otherwise permitted by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, on 
premises which allow the sale or con~umption of intoxicating 
liquors. 4 
The City submits that inasmuch as it is contrary to state 
law to sell beer to any person under the age of twenty-one, that 
the subject ordinance is a reasonable extension of its power to 
prohibit persons under the age·of twenty-one from frequenting 
certain establishments holding Class "C" beer licenses which have 
as their principal business activity the selling of beer. 
Finally, the City maintains_ that the decision .of the 
district court is totally in error due to its failure to 
recognize the principles enunciated in this Court's decision in 
State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 {Utah, 1980). In Hutchinson, 
the Court upheld the right of Salt Lake County to enact an 
ordinance under the general welfare power to regulate elections 
' 
even though the County had not been given a specific grant of 
authority to enact such an ordinance. In so doing, the Court 
overturned the Dillon Rule, which had long been the law of this 
3section 32-4-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, attached 
as Append ix "E". 
4california v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972). 
-7-
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state, and which provided that all. powers granted to local 
governments should be strictly construed. The court held: 
"When the state has granted general welfare power to 
local governments, those governments have independent 
authority apart from, and in addition to, speciffc 
grants of authority to pass ordinances which are 
reasonably and appropriately related to the objectives 
of that power, i.e. providing for the public safety,· 
health, morals and welfare. (citations omitted) And 
the courts will not interfere with the legislative 
choice of the means elected unless it is arbitrary, or 
is directly prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the 
policy of, the state or federal laws or the 
constitution of this state or of the United States. 
Specific grants of authority may serve to limit the 
means available under the general welfare clause, for 
some limitation may be imposed on the exercise of power 
by directing the use of power in a particular manner. 
But specific grants should generally be construed with 
reasonable latitude in light of the broad language of 
the general welfare clause which may supplement the 
power found in a specific delegation. 
"Broad construction of the powers of counties and 
cities is consistent with the current needs of local 
governments. The Dillon Rule of strict construction is 
antithetical to effective and efficient local and state 
government." Id. at 1126.· 
---while-- paying' lip- -service to -this Court's - holding in· 
Hutchinson, the district court nevertheless strictly construed 
both the specific grant of authority given to cities to prohibit 
the sale of ·beer to persons under twenty-one and also the City's 
general welfare clause. The district court struck down the 
ordinance as an ultra vires act of the City. The City maintains 
that such a decision is simply contrary to the enabling statutes 
cited above and to this Court's holding in Hutchinson. 
-8-
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B. LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENTS ARE PRESUMED TO BE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND SHOULD NOT BE LIGHTLY 
OVERTURNED. 
The decision of the district court is even more troubling in 
view of the ease with which the district court came to the 
conclusion that the subject ordinance was unconstitutional. It 
has long been the law of the state that legislative enactments 
are presumed to be constitutional and will be overturned only if 
the statute or ordinance is clearly in conflict with a higher law 
or the constitution. This Court recently reaffirmed this 
principle in Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, (Utah, 1981 ) .. In 
upholding the constitutionality of a state statute, the Court 
held: 
"There are certain principles of law relating to the 
validity of statutes which have a bearing on the 
problem of constitutionality here presented. The first 
and foundational one is that the prerogative of the 
legislature as the creators of the law, is to be 
respected. Consequently, its enactments are accorded a 
presumption of validity; and the courts do not strike 
down a legislative act unless fh~ interests of justice 
in the particular case before it require doing so 
because the act is clearly in conflict with the higher 
law, as set forth in the Constitution." Id. at 80. 
The ordinance in question was enacted pursuant to the 
authority delegated to the City by the legislature, and springs 
from the police power. This is a power inherent in the state to 
safeguard the general welfare of its citizens. Laws passed 
pursuant to it are purely local in nature and sensitive to the. 
particular needs of the people. This court has enunciated the 
-9-
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following rule regarding judicial interference with legislative 
enactments made pursuant to local police powers: 
"The act must be upheld and enforced unless it 
manifestly bears no relation to public health, morals, 
welfare, or other legitimate objects of the police 
power, or, if it does bear such relation, unless it is 
a plain invasion of constitutional rights." State v. 
Packer, 77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 at 1016 (Utah, 1931) 
The legislature has declared that it is unlawful for a 
person under the age of twenty-one to buy or consume alcoholic 
beverages. Bars and taverns have as their primary activity the 
selling of draft beer. It is certainly reasonable to restrict 
those persons who cannot lawfully buy or consume alcoholic 
beverages from such premises.· 
Such a regulation is even more sustainable in light of the 
fact that adult entertainment is often provided on such prem~ses 
in the form of "go-go dancers". The environment, atmosphere, and 
in many cases, the clientele of bars and taverns simply make such 
places--not ··suitab-le-~·-~for the -pr-esence---- of minors- and- -under-aged 
persons. 
In fact, the legislature has prohibited taverns and bars 
' ... 
from being located in proximity to churches and schools--places_ 
where minors are likely to be. 
The City has further restricted such establishments to 
commercial districts, away from its residential neighborhoods and 
parks in order to preserve the integrity of the latter and reduce 
the influence of bars and alcohol in the community. 
-10-
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Regulations pertaining to the sale of beer are without 
question permissible and desirable under the police power. In 
contrast, however, the district court has failed to give any 
reason, other than its feeling that the state law prohibiting the 
sale of beer to persons under age twenty-one should be strictly 
construed, why the ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable in 
keeping such persons from bars where draft.beer is sold. 
As demonstrated above, the ordinance clearly bears a 
relationship to the public· welfare by regulating the sale of beer 
in the community. Section 19-3-9, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 1965, as amended, is one of a number of regula-
tions established by ordinance which serves to restrict the 
influence of bars and taverns from schools, churches, parks, and 
under-aged persons. The ordinance constitutes a legitimate and 
reasonable exercise of the police power delegated to the C.i ty and 
its validity should be upheld. 
C. THE CITY HAS EXPRESS AUTHORITY TO ENACT STRICT 
LIABILITY ORDINANCES. 
The district court recognized the right of the state to 
enact strict liability statutes which _dispense with an intent or 
mens rea requirement. The validity of strict liability statutes 
has long been upheld as an exception to the general rule 
requiring intent as an element of criminal statutes. See 
Morissette v. U.S. 342 U.S. 246 (1951} and U.S. v. Bailey, 440 
U.S. 394 (1979). 
-11-
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The United States Supreme Court has stressed both the 
state's power to enact strict liability statutes as well as the 
limitations of such power: 
"Still, it is doubtless competent for the State to 
create strict criminal liabilities by defining criminal 
offenses without any element of scienter ••• though 
there is precident in this Court that this power is not 
without limitations." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 
147, 150 (1959) 
Utah has provided for the enactment of strict liability 
statutes in the State Criminal Code, Section 76-1-101, et seq., 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Section 76-2-101, provides: 
"No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct 
is prohibited by law and: 
11 1.. He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 
or with criminal negligence with respect to each 
element of the offense as the definition of the offense 
requires; or 
"2. His acts constitute an offense involving 
strict liability. 
"Every offense not involving strict liability shall 
require a culpable mental state, and when the def ini-
tion of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice 
to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall 
involve strict liability only when a statute defining . 
the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to 
impose strict liability for the conduct by the use of 
the phrase 'strict liability' or other terms of similar 
import." 
The district court, however, ruled that these two statutes 
were only applicable to the state legislature, and that like 
authority was not afforded to local governments under these 
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statutes. Finding.no other enabling legislation specifying that 
municipalities may enact strict liability ordinances, including 
the general welfare power, the district court ruled that the City 
had exceeded its powers by including a strict liability provision 
in Section 19-3-9 and held the ordinance unconstitutional. 
The City respectfully submits that it is bound by the state 
Criminal Code both by the provisions of the Code itself, and by 
the declarations of this Court. Section 76-1-103, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides in relevant part: 
"The provisions of this code shall govern the construc-
tion of, the punishment for, and defenses against any 
off~nse defined in this code or • • • any offense 
defined outside this code ••• " 
This court has previously held that municipalities are 
subject to the provisions of the state criminal code. Allgood v. 
Larsen, 545 P.2d 530 (Utah, 1976). In Allgood, this court struck 
down the City's trespass ordinance on the basis that it allowed 
imprisonment as·a penalty-·for violation--of ·the·ordinance. Under 
the state criminal code, trespass had been reclassified as an 
infraction for which no imprisonment could be imposed. This 
Court held that the City had no power to make trespass a greater 
offense than that provided by state law and cited the provisions 
of Section 76-1-103, set forth above, as authority for its 
holding. 
Though the only ordinance before the court was Section 
19-3-9, the district court also noted that all of the offenses in 
-13-
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Chapter 3 of Title 19 of the City's ordinances contained a strict 
liability element. This chapter contains fifteen sections which 
all pertain to the regulation and sale of beer. 5 Six of the 
provisions specifically pertain to persons under the age of 
twenty-one. These six sections prohibit such persons from being 
present on certain premises or portions of premises, where beer 
or liquor is served, prohibit the sale of beer to such persons, 
and prohibt such persons from having such beverages in their 
possession. 
The remainder of the ordinances in this chapter pertain to 
regulations and conditions upon which beer may be sold, i.e., it 
is unlawful to sell beer to an intoxicated person. 6 
The district court held that whatever powers the general 
welfare clause conferred upon the City, those powers did not 
include the right to make a portion of the City's regulations 
perta.in ing _ _,_tQ, beer ~.sales .. s. tr ic.t 1 i ab.il i ty: ___ of fens~s _.~~The __ ~is tr i<? t_ 
court reasoned: 
"If the general welfare clause authorizes cities to 
enact such ordinances,, what is to prohibit a city from 
making all its offenses 'strict liability offenses', 
thereby removing state of mind as a necessary element 
in all crimes." p. 5 Memorandum Decision, attached as 
Append ix " C" • 
5
chapter 3, Title 19, ROSLC is attached as Appendix "F". 
6
see Section 19-3-2, ROSLC, in Appendix "F". 
-14-
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The City submits that the only strict liability offenses it 
has enacted are contained in Chapter 3 of Title 19, Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah. These ordinances, as has 
been pointed out, are very narrow in scope and pertain to only a 
limited portion of the City's regulations governing the sale of 
alcoholic beverages. The City has recognized these ordinances as 
an exception to the general requirement that intent is either 
imputed or specifically required in all criminal offenses. 
Title 32 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
contains the public offenses relating to peace, morals, property 
and conduct of the City, none of which contain a strict liability 
provision, nor do any of the other City ordinances involve such a 
provision. 
The City submits that it is prohibited from including a 
strict liability provision in all of its ordinances by the law, 
as set forth by the United States Supreme Court, c'ited above • 
. 
The City readily acknowledges that it could not, has not, and 
does not intend to, make all violations of City's ordinances 
... _ 
strict liability offenses. However, the subject ordinance does 
fall within the guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme 
Court in Morissette, supra, for enacting a strict liability 
offense: 
"The accused, if he does not will the violation, 
usually is in a position to prevent it with no more 
care than society might· reasonably expect and no more 
exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who 
assumed his responsibilities. 
-15-
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* * * 
"Many statutes which are in the nature of police 
regulation, as. this is, impose criminal penalties 
irrespective of any intent to violate them;- the purpose 
being to require a degree of diligence for the protec-
tion of the public which shall render violation 
impossible." Id. at 256, 257. 
The City maintains that tavern licensees and their employees 
are in positions, whereby with reasonable execution and due care, 
they may insure that }?ersons under the age of twenty-one will not_ 
be allowed to enter such premises. The burden of so doing is 
minimal as compared to the public's interest in regulating 
alcohol and protecting minors. 
In the instant case, the Defendant-Ronneburg and the 
employees under his supervision were admittedly aware of the law 
prohibiting under-aged persons from the premises of the tavern. 
The defendant had instructed the employees of the tavern to keep 
such persons from the tavern premises. The defendant a_~d h_i~ ______ _ 
subordinates were in a position to prevent the offense with no 
more care than society might reasonably expect. 
The district court has, by implication, ruled the entire 
chapter of regulations, pertaining to the sale of beer, 
unconstitutional because of the strict liability element included 
in each. The City maintains the district court's decision is 
based upon unsound reasoning and should be overturned. 
-16-
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CONCLUSION 
The City respectfully submits that Section 19-3-9, Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City,· Utah, 1965, is constitutional in 
all respects. The ordinance's presumptive validity is sustained 
by both specific enabling legislation and by the case law of this 
state. The City has been given both specific and general grants 
of authority to regulate the sale of beer, includ.ing its complete 
prohibition within the City's jurisdiction .. The enactment of an 
ordinance which prohibits under-aged persons from the atmosphere 
and elements of premises of bars and taverns is reasonable 
exercise of the City's police power. 
The City also has specific enabling powers in limited 
instances to enact -s·trict liability offenses. The City has 
chosen to do so in regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages and 
persons under the age of twenty-one. Such a limited exercise of 
this power__ by_ the _.CLty is_ r_easonable---unde~ - its pol-ice-· power--· and 
the cons·ti tutional i ty of the ordinance should be upheld. 
cm31 
DATED this day of February, 1982. 
---
ROGER F. CUTLER 
Salt Lake City Attorney 
PAUL. G. MAUGHAN 
Assistant City Attorney 
-Attorney for Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Sec. 19-2-6. Class "C" license. A class "C" retail 
license shall entitle the licensee to sell beer on 
draft for consumption on or off the premises and to 
all the privileges granted the holders of class "A" 
and "B" retail licenses in accordance with the liquor 
control act of Utah. 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Sec. 19-3-9. Unlawful to permit minors in certain 
establishments. It shall be unlawful and shall 
constitute an offense of strict liability for any 
licensee of a class "C", or class "D", license for 
the sale of beer or any operator, agent, or employee 
of such licensee to permit any person under the age 
of twenty-one years to remain in or about such 
licensed premises. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
GUY V. RONNEBURG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. CRA 81-4 
This case is before this court on appeal from a judgment 
of conviction and sentence entered in the Circuit Court, Salt 
Lake Department, wherein the defendant was charged with violation 
of Section 19-3-9 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, the 
complaint alleging that on November 6, 1980, the defendant unlaw-
fully permitted or allowed a minor under the age of 21 to remain 
in or about a class C tavern licensed to sell beer. Cheryl D. 
Luke, Esq., appearing for Salt Lake City, Plaintiff, and Robert 
H. Henderson, Esq., appearing for Guy V. Ronneburg, Defendant. 
Upon request, oral argument was heard, following which counsel 
were given the opportunity to submit briefs on the question of 
the constitutionality_of the ordinance. -The briefs having been 
submitted and considered, the court renders its decision thereon. 
In November, 1980, the defendant was employed as the food 
and beve~age manager at the Ramada Inn. On November 6, 1980, the 
manager of the Inn was away for the day and left defendant in 
charge of the Inn as the acting manager. On that day a regularly 
scheduled fashion show took place in the Study Lounge which oper-
ated ~ith a class C beer license. One of the participants in the 
fashion show was Dusty Larkin, a 19 year old woman. On the 6th of 
November police officers went to the Ramada Inn to investigate a 
. r 
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SALT LAKE CITY V. 
RONNE BURG PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
complaint that minors were participating in the fashion show. 
A police officer talked to Dusty Larkin in the change room, 
determined that she was 19 years old, and when defencant advised 
the officer he was in charge of the Inn that evening, the com-
plaint charging him with violation of Section 19-3-9 was filed. 
He was tried, convicted and appealed to this court. 
That ordinance provides that it shall be unlawful and 
"shall consitute an offense of strict liability" for any l~censee, 
or any employee of such licenseeJto permit any person under the 
age of 21 years to remain in or about such licensed premises. 
Therewasno evidence presented at the trial that defendant knew 
on the evening in question that Larkin was under the age of 21 
years, but counsel for the city contends that the ordinance being 
one of "strict liability", knowledge and intent are not necessary 
elements of the offense in question. Such appears to be the law· 
under strict liability statutes. (21 Aro Jur 2d 169, Sec 89; 
Morissette v U.S., 342 U.S. 246; U.S. v Dolterwiech, 320 U.S. 277.) 
In People v. Batt.in, __ 77 Cal App 3rd 635, 95 ALR 3rd 248, the court 
noted that strict liability crimes are those which, unlike general 
intent and specific ·intent, do not require the union of criminal 
acts and criminal intent. Section 76-2-102, UCA 1953, ·as amended 
states that every c:riminal offense "not involving strict liabi_lity" 
shall require· a -culpable mental state-. That --section also states 
that an offense shall involve strict liability only when a statute 
defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to 
impose strict liability for the conduct by use of the phrase "strict 
liability." Section 76-2-101 states that no person is guilty of an 
offense unless the conduct is prohibited by law and that person 
acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with cri~inal negli-
gence with respect to each element of the offense as the definition 
requires or the acts "constitute an offense involving strict lia-
bility." These provisions apply to state statutes and are not to be 
61 
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SALT Ll\~C. \I.LL l y. 
RONNE BURG PAGE 3 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
construed as constituting legislative authority to cities or 
counties to enact ordinances defining crimes as "strict lia-
bility" offenses. 
As I see it, the main issue involved in this case is the 
constitutionality of the ordinance. This involves a consideration 
of the scope of the offense as well as its "strict liability" 
provision. In her brief, counsel for the city contends that 
legislative authority for the city to enact the ordinance in 
question is to be found in Sec. 10-8-84, commonly referred to as 
the "general welfare clause", which authorizes cities to pass all 
ordinances as are necessary and proper to provide for the safety 
and preserve the health and promote the prosperity and to improve 
the morals, peace and good order, comfort and convenience of the 
city and the inhabitants thereof. 
Counsel cites State v. Hutchinson, decided by the Supreme 
Court of Utah on December. 9, 1980, Case No. 16087 as holding that 
this general welfare clause is not to be strictly construed and 
constitutes legislative authority to enact the ordinance in question. 
In Hutchinson the court said: 
"The enactment of a broad general welfare clause 
conferring police power directly on the counties was 
to enable them to act in every reasonable, necessary and 
appropriate way to further the public welfare of their 
citizens." 
It- further stated:.-- -. 
"These cases state the rule which we adopt in this 
case. When the state has granted welfare power to local 
governments, those governments have independent authority 
apart from, and in addition to specific grants of authority 
to pass ordinances which reasonably and appropriately 
related to the objectives of that power, i.e., providing 
for the public safety, health, morals and welfare. 
(Citation omitted) And the courts will not interfere with 
the legislative choice of the means selected unless it is 
arbitrary, or is directly prohibited by, or is.inconsistent 
with the policy of, the state or federal laws, or the con-
stitution of this state or of the United States. Specific 
grants of authority may serve to limit the means available 
under the general welfare clause, for some limitation may 
be· imposed on the exercise of power by directing the use 
6Z 
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Also: 
of power in a particular manner. But specific grants 
should generally be construed with reasonable latitude 
in light of the broad language of the general welfare 
clause which may supplement the power found in a specific 
delegation." 
"County ordinances are valid unless they conflict 
with superior law; do not rationally promote the public 
health, safety, morals and welfare; or are preempted by 
state policy or otherwise attempt to regulate an area 
which by the nature of the subject matter itself requires 
uniform state regulation. Of course a specific power 
delegated to municipalities may imply a restriction upon 
the manner of exercise of that power, but the restriction 
of the exercise of that power is to be construed to permit 
a reasonable discretion and latitude in attaining the 
purpose to be achieved". 
Section 10-8-47, UCA 1953, contains a· specific grant of 
authority to cities to, among other things, prohibit the sale, 
giving away or furnishing of intoxicating liquors or narcotics 
or tobacco to any person under 21 years of age. The state legis-
lature expressly has provided that no person shall sell or supply 
alcoholic beverage to any person under the age of 21 years, 
(Sec. 32-7-15(1)) and also that no person under the age of 21 
shall purchase, consume or possess any alcoholic beverage 
(Sec. 32-7~15.4). I have found no statute that prohibits person~ 
under 21 from being in or about premises where alcoholic beverages 
are sold or consumed. Indeed, there is no prohibition under the 
state law for children under 18 years of age from being in or about 
premises such as restaurants where alcoholic beverages may be 
obtained or consumed. 
Two things about the ordinance in question trouble me from 
a constitutional point of view. It seems arbitrary and unreason-
able to me for the city to prohibit an adult person under 21 years 
of age from being in or about a public lounge in a public hotel 
merely because the lounge has had a class C beer license issued to 
it, particularly where a specific grant of authority is granted to 
the city only to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor to persons 
' • 63 
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SALT LAKE CITY V. 
RONNE BURG PAGE 5 MEMORANDUM DECISIO~ 
under 21. Secondly, it is apparent that in Chapter 3 of Title 
19 of the city ordinances, all offenses defined therein are given 
a "strict liability" element. As noted, this does away with any 
intent as a necessary element. If the general welfare clause 
authorizes cities to enact such ordinances, what is to prohibit 
a city from making all.its offenses "strict liability offenses", 
thereby removing state of mind as a necessary element.in all crimes. 
I do not believe such an ordinance is "reasonably and appropriately 
related" to the power to provide for public safety~ health, morals 
and welfare of the people. I believe that this sort of a "legis-
lative choice" is arbitrary on the part of the city. I see no 
compelling reason making it necessary to make the offense in 
question one of strict liability. I do not believe the broad 
interpretation to be given the general welfare clause under the 
Hutchinson case extends to such a grant of authority. 
For the reasons stated I find the ordinance is unconsti-
tutional and so rule. Accordingly, the judgment of the Circuit 
Court is vacated and the complaint filed in the case is dismissed. 
Dated this 2 <j day of July, 1981. 
... ,_ 
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APPENDIX "D" 
Sec. 10-8-84. Ordinances--Punishrnent. They may pass 
all ordinances and rules, and make all regulations, 
not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into 
effect or discharging all powers and duties conferred 
by this chapter, and such as are necessary and proper 
to provide for the safety and preserve the health, 
and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace 
and good order, comfort and convenience of the city 
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection 
of property therein; and may enforce obedience to such 
ordinances with such fines or penalties as they may 
deem proper; provided, that the punishment of any _ 
offense shall be by fine in any sum not to exceed $299 
or by imprisonment not to ~xceed six months, or by · 
both such fine and-_ imprisonrnent.-_:..i ,_ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX "E" 
Sec. 32-4-17. Retail licenses--Light beer--Sales 
to minors.--(a) Cities and towns within their 
corporate limits, and counties outside of incorporated 
cities and towns shall have power to license, tax, 
regulate or prohibit the sale of light beer, at retail, 
in bottles or draft; provided, that no such licenses 
shall be granted to sell beer in any dance hall, 
theater or in the pro~imity of any church or school. 
The corrunission' granting the :license -shall:.: have ----
authority to determine in each case what shall consti-
tute proximity. -
- -- -- ·---(b) In addition' to other pen-al ties which are~=.:._ 
provided in this act, the- license of ahy person to 
sell light beer shall either be revoked or suspended 
for a period of not less than thirty (30) days, upon 
conviction of selling or furnishing beer to a minor. 
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APPENDIX "F" 
-· ........... - ~-: - . 
. - ... __ ~.: . .. -.:: . 
- - - ,: -~~- - . 
' . ······ f~a~t~r :J - ·• A~~1~~!~·- ~-
BEER REGULATIONS - ·:--- ~--~-=~:._.> .- --~- - ~ 
cS«-· 19Bt~ ~~~l.~~s_:u,~:!'f 2-:-~~~~f;:~·:3};~~ _: _ 
SectiOns::: -:· :- ' ·-~.L- ~···:-:·· -~-------~-;:.~·~·1::'-.(-~-< ~:... - - ·-· - ~-
19-3-1. Unlawful to sell beer without license. 
19-3-2. Sale to in.toxicated person prohibited. 
19-3-3. Advertising sale. 
19-3-4. Nuisance prohibited. 
19-3-5. Wholesaler and retailer not to have common intere~ts. 
19-3-6. _ Minimum light._ajld open yiew- required in li~ens-~d-~prelajses. 
19-3-7~ - Sale to minors proh_!bited. _ _ ==- _ ;_ -_ ~<----.--- - -_: __ -~-~7- ~---- ~=- -_- - -
1·9-3-8_ ~-~Pre~ence of minors in certain establishments prohibited~ - '.-~- ~;-
- · 19;3·~9:;- _ .. uni~-wfui t~~P~~~t I'Ilin~rs in -cer~i~ '-~stablfshmen-t!i~ ~-~ _· ~- --~ -~~~~;~:-·:;_~1 ~- _-
19-3-10. Presence of minors ·in portions of certain establi~hments -pr~- -_-'"c·:.- --- ~== 
hibited. ---
19-3-1 L Unlawful to permit minors in portions of certian. 
establishments. 
19-3-12~ 
19-3-13. 
19-3-14. 
19-3-15. 
Possession of beer prohibited to minors. Exception. 
Unlawful to permit intoxicated persons on licensed premises. 
Sale or disposition of beer between certain hours unlawful 
Entert.ainer regulations. 
= -·-- - - .. ·-;.:::-:."": .. ; . --- - - -- - -
Oct .• 1976 
Aug., 1978 
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BEER REGULATIONS 19-3-1-19-3-6 
Sec. 19-3-1. Unlawful to sell beer without license. It shall be unlawful and 
shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any person to sell beer or to 
permit the consumption of beer in any premises unless such premise~ are 
licensed for such sale or consumption. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute 
an offense of strict liability for any licensee to violate the terms of his license 
and it shall be unlawful and constitute an offense of strict liability for any 
person, unless he shall be so licensed, to sell bottled, canned or draft beer to 
be consumed on the premises. 
Sec. 19-3-2. Sale to intoxicated person proluoited. It shall be unlawful and 
shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any person to sell beer to any 
intoxicated person or to any person under the influence of any intoxicating 
beverage. 
Sec. 19-3-3. Advertising sale. It shall constitute an offense of strict 
liability to violate the provisions of this section. It shall be unlawful to 
advertise the sale of light beer except under such regulation as is made by the 
liquor control commission of Utah; provided, that one simple designation of 
the fact that beer is sold under city license may be placed in or upon the 
window or front of the licensed premises which designation shall not exceed 
one hundred dollars in cost. No beer, wholesaler, distributor, warehouseman, 
or other person shall furnish to any retailer nor shall any retailer display any 
sign which shall exceed fifteen hundred squa~e inches in area. 
Sec. 19-3-4. Nuisance prohibited. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute 
an offense of strict liability for any person to keep or maintain a nuisance as 
the same is defined in this title. 
Sec. 19-3-5. Wholesaler and retailer not to have common interests. It 
shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any 
dealer, brewer or wholesaler to either directly or indirectly supply, give or 
pay for any furniture, furnishings or fixtures of a retailer, and it shall be 
unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any dealer or 
brewer to advance funds or money or pay for any license for a retailer or to be 
financially interested either directly or indirectly in the conduct or operation 
of the business of any retailer. 
Sec. 19-3-6. Minimum light and open view required in licensed premises. 
It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any 
person to own or operate any premises licensed for the sale of beer without 
complying with the following lighting and view requirements: 
(1) During business hours a minimum of one candle power light 
measured at a level of five feet above the floor shall be maintained. 
(2) No enclosed booths, blinds, or stalls shall be erected or maintained. 
(3) There shall be a clear and unobstructed access. to all portions of the 
interior where patrons are permitted or served. 
501 
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19-3· 7 -19-3-12 INTOXICATING LIQUORS 
Sec.19-3-7. Sale to minors prohibited. It shall be unlawful and shall con-
stitute an offense of strict liability to sell beer to any person under the age of 
twenty-one years. 
Sec. 19-3-8. Presence of minors in class "C" and class" D" premises pro-
hibited. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability 
for any person under the age of twenty-one years to: (a) Enter or be in or about 
any premises licerised as a class "C", or class "D" establishment, for the sale 
of beer, or (b) To drink beer or any other alcoholic beverages in said licensed 
premises. (c) Any person violating any provision of this section shall be 
deemed guilty of an infraction and may not be imprisoned, but shall be 
punishable by a fine not to exceed $299. No. 74, 11 July 1980 
Sec. 19-3-9. Unlawful to permit minors in certain establishments. It 
shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any 
licensee of a class "C", or class "D", license for the sale of beer or any 
operator, agent, or employee of such licensee to permit any person under the 
age of twenty-one-years to remain in or about such licensed premises.~ -, . 
Sec.19-3-10. Presence of minors in or around any lounge or bar area pro-. 
hibited. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability 
for any person under the age of twenty-one years to: (a) Enter or be in or 
around any lounge or bar area in premises licensed with a "club" or 
"seasonal" license for the sale of beer, or (b) Be in or around any lounge or 
bar area or premises licensed with a liquor consumption license. (c) Any per-
son violating any provision of this section shall be deemed gililty of an in-
fraction and may not be imprisoned, but shall be punishable by a fine not to · 
exceed $299. · 
No. 74, 11 July 1980 
Sec. 19-3-11. Unlawful to permit minors in portions of certain 
establishments. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict 
liability for any licensee of a "club" or "seasonal" license for the sale of beer 
or licensee of a liquor consumption license or any operator, agent or 
employee of said licensee to have any person under the age of twenty-one 
years in or about the lounge or bar area of such licensed premises. 
Sec.19-3-12. · Possession of alcoholic beverages prohibited to minors. Ex-
ception. It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense involving strict 
liability for any person under the age of twenty-one years of age to purchase, 
accept or have in his or her possession an alcoholic beverage, including beer or 
intoxicating liquor; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to: (a) 
The acceptance of alcoholic beverages by such person for me~icinal purposes 
supplied only by the parent or guardian of such person or the administering 
of such alcoholic beverage by a physician in accordance with the law, or (b) 
persons under twenty-one years of age who are bona fide employees in class 
502 
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 
No. 2' of 1911 
(Sale OI' diSPOSitbl of beer be-
~ certain hours unlawful) 
AN ORDINANCE AMEND-
ING SECTION 19-3-U OF 
THE REVISED ORDINANC-
ES OF SALT LAKE CITY, 
UTAH, 1965, RELATING TO 
SALE OR DISPOSITION OF 
BEER BETWEEN CERTAIN 
HOURS UNLAWFUL 
Be it ordained by the City 
Council of Salt Lake City, 
Utah: 
SECTION 1. That Section 19-
3-U of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1965, 
relating to Sale or disµosition 
of beer between certain hours 
unlawful, be, and the same 
hereby is, amended as fol-
lows: 
Sec. 19-3-U. Sale or diSPOSk - -
tion of beer between certain - -~" 
hours unlawful. It shall be_ 
unlawful and shall constiMe 
an offense of strict liability for 
any licensee or any employee ""' -
thereof to sell, diSPOSe, °' --- -
give away or deliver beer or ,_- -=- _ 
permit the consumption there-~~_-_--::-,;:. -
of on the licensed premises - , ~=-:: 
between the hours of one o'c-- - - ---"·:-
lock a.m. and seven o'clock - ---~ 
a.m. on any day from No--~-- --- -
vember 1 to April 30, inclu- - "" -
slve, or between the hours of 
two o'clock a.m. and seven 
o'clock a.m. of any day from 
May 1 to October 31, inclu-
sive, regardless of whether 
Daylight Savings Time may 
be In force or effect. As an 
exception to the foregoing 
requirements, beer consum~ 
tion on the Ileen~ premises 
may be permitted until two 
o'clock a.m. on New Year's 
Day. - ,. 
SECTION 2. This Ordinance 
shalt take effect thirty (lO)' 
days after its first publication. -- -
Passed by the City Council:-__ 
of Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
7th day of April, 1981. _-· - --
PALMER DePAUus-- .=:: ~ 
CHAIRMAN ---- --~-
ATTEST: -=::=::-: -
KATHRYN MARSHALL 
ACTING CITY RECORDER 
Transmittal to Mayor on April 
1, 1981 
Mayors Action: 
TED L. WILSON 
MAYOR 
ATTEST: 
KATHRYN MARSHALL 
ACTING CITY RECORDER 
(SEAL) 
BILL NO. 26 of 1981 
Published April U, 1981 
C-67 
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BEER REGULATIONS 19-3-13 
. . di h f th · employment therein or 
"A" licensed premises while in the sc arge 0 err . . h 11 b 
. 1 · · ·on of this section s a e thereabouts. Any person v10 ating any provis1 . . ed but shall be 
deemed guilty of an infraction and may not be impnson ' 
punishable by a fine not to exceed $299. No. 74, 11 July 1980 
Sec 19-3-13. Unlawful to permit intoxicated persons on the_ lic~ns~~ 
· · It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of stnct liabili-prem1ses. hi t Ioyees 
ty for any person licensed to sell beer or for any of s a~en 8 or emp . 
to allow intoxicated persons to remain in or about any licensed prermses. 
April, 1976 Aug., 1978 
April, 1978 
LIQUOR CONSUMPTION LICENSES 19-3-14-19-3-15 
~ ~q,\. . 
Sec. 19-3-14.~ Sale or disposition of beer between certain hours unlawful. 
It shall be unlawful and shall constitute an offense of strict liability for any 
licensee or any employee thereof to sell, dispose, or give away or deliver beer 
or permit the consumption thereof on the licensed premises between the 
hours of one o'clock a.m. and seven o'clock a.m. on any day from November 1 
to April 30, inclusive, or between the hours of two o'clock a.m. and seven 
o'clock a.m. of any day from May 1 to October 31, inclusive, regardless of 
whether Daylight Savings Time may be in force or effect; provided, however, 
that when New Year's Day falls on Monday the_ sale and consumption of beer - ~-~~ 
on licensed premises may be permitted until three o'clock a.m. of said day as -
an exception of the foregoing requirement. - __ _ 
Sec. 19-3-15. Entertainer regulations. It shall be unlawful and shall 
constitute an offense of strict liability for any owner, operator, manager, 
lessee or licensee, or any agent, employee or person acting with the consent of 
such owner, operator, manager, lessee or licensee of any place of business 
licensed to sell beer in Salt Lake City, to allow or permit any dancer, 
entertainer or other person to appear in or on said place of business naked or 
so clothed as to expose in any way the buttocks, genitals, pubic area, or the 
female breast of said dancer, entertainer or other person. 
It shall also be unlawful and constitute an offense of strict liability for any 
such dancer or entertainer or other person to appear in said place of business 
naked or so clothed as to expose at any time of appearance the buttocks, 
genitals, pubic area or the female breast. 
Violations of provisions of this chapter shall be grounds for suspension or 
revocation of the license or licenses of the ·establishments where violations 
occur. 
Chapter4 
LIQUOR CONSUMPTION LICENSES 
nlawful to allow consumption without license. 
"'1f',~~1 .. ai\0~,.; _-.i\l~onsumption prohibited in unlicensed premises. 
__ _.,.-:--."'......;-1- _ _r:yjcense annlication. 
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